This seems to have ended debate over NWE within economics for several decades. Officially, the stance of the profession echoed Samuelson's deflationary position about the aspirations of NWE, vii but in practice it provided a "professional consensus" for so-called 'applied' welfare economics, "to increase, to society's general benefit, the influence on public policy of good 
Given that, as Cropsey notes, NWE abstracts away from institutions, including institution of justice, xi it is no surprise that "The practically decisive differences between polities are subordinated to their common economic property: they must all serve to gratify in the highest degree the arbitrary preferences of irreducible individuals," (124; emphasis added). So, unlike
Rawls, who emphasizes that ultimately NWE is a representative agent theory (1971: 24),
Cropsey focuses on NWE's official commitment to individualism (recall Samuelson's second assumption above): "welfare or the good is again conceived as, for every man, unique." (124) Cropsey's distinct criticism (with shades of natural law theory or moral rationalism) is that ultimately NWE rests on brute facts ("idiosyncratic preferences," (116) Third, Cropsey has decidedly metaphysical leanings; he writes, for example:
[T]he foregoing discussion implies that the mathematical method, like every method, has a supra-methodical meaning; every logic presupposes a metaphysic. This is eminently true of mathematics as a method of inquiry in welfare economics…In so far as the application of mathematical analysis to welfare economics either relies upon or itself creates the presumption that (1) knowledge of the flux of a thing is possible in the absence of knowledge of the nature of the thing… (118)
The key insight lurking in this abstruse bit of reasoning is that if Samuelson's self-understanding is taken at face value, then when applied to empirical reality, NWE offers knowledge of (hypothetical) relations, not a substantive conception (of Right) worth having. But according to
Cropsey even these relations are an "aggregate of the preferences of an unclassified human heterogeneity vis-a-vis an unclassified heterogeneity of goods and services;" they have nontrivial metaphysical commitments: "The mathematical characterization of welfare rests upon a far-reaching assumption as to the role and meaning of species or natural differences among classes of things. In effect it denies those natural specific differences, replacing them by genera each of which is a spectrum of irreducible individuals. But genera not composed of species ought to be called aggregations, or perhaps assortments. The mathematical view of welfare flows from a rearrangement of natural things which is as much a de-ordering as a re-ordering." (124) One need not share Cropsey's metaphysical commitments, to recognize that he is correct that in addition to having undesirable moral consequences, when applied, NWE is also a controversial social ontology. 
